Sacrifice and Civic Membership: Who Earns Rights, and When?1
Julie Novkov
University at Albany, SUNY

“The Negro is a man!”
Senator Daniel Clark, R-New Hampshire, February 14, 1866 (Epps 2006: 118)

In 1927, the US Supreme Court decided Buck v. Bell, considering Virginia’s policy of
compulsory sterilization for those deemed unfit to reproduce by the state. In the ruling, the Court
cleared the state to sterilize Carrie Buck, described by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his
opinion as “a feeble minded white woman” (Buck v. Bell 1927: 205). Holmes’ infamous quip in
the ruling was that “three generations of imbeciles are enough” (Id. at 207), but the opinion of
this former soldier hints at an interesting theory of the relationship between sacrifice and
citizenship.
Holmes is best known among us as a Supreme Court Justice, fighting on the bench to
bring his pragmatic and realist visions into the backward-looking jurisprudence of the Lochner
era. But Holmes the soldier – the man who was wounded and whose friends died beside him at
Antietam and Fredericksburg – preceded Holmes the law professor and then judge. And this
soldier saw military service as the pinnacle of a citizen’s service to the state. In justifying
Virginia’s sterilization policy, Holmes explained:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength
of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. [Id.]
Masculine citizenship thus implicitly entails the potential for the sacrifice of life in war, the
greatest and noblest sacrifice that can be provided to the state as an earnest token of the
citizenship of free men. The demand of this noble sacrifice renders other less noble sacrifices –
particularly reproductive sacrifices – justifiable.
Holmes’s reasoning on this issue went back far before his service on the bench. In an
address delivered to graduating seniors at Harvard College on Memorial Day in 1895, he situated
participation in military conflict (and its proxy, dangerous sport) as a divine educational
experience fitting men for worthiness as leaders. Military brotherhood was, for Holmes, the
antidote to cynical individualism and undisciplined consumption; he argued that “high and
dangerous action teaches us to believe as right beyond dispute things for which our doubting
minds are slow to find words of proof. Out of heroism grows faith in the worth of heroism”
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(Holmes 1895). The death and carnage of war (and dangerous sport) were not necessarily tragic,
but rather, “a price well paid for the breeding of a race fit for headship and command” (Id.).
These values appeared to be particularly necessary as the Civil War generation was aging and
passing into political and civil twilight, leaving the mantle of leadership to fall to the Gilded Age
generation.
Holmes’ 1895 vision was deeply gendered. He recognized the rising impulses toward
reform in the United States and informed the young putative leaders he was addressing, “Behind
every scheme to make the world over, lies the question, What kind of world do you want? The
ideals of the past for men have been drawn from war, as those for women have been drawn from
motherhood” (Id.). Of the masculine ideals, honor stood at the top, an ideal for the sacrifice of
one’s life was an acceptable bargain. The value of this bargain hallowed the state. While women,
too, could serve the state, the feminine ideals of reproduction and caring were not ideals that
facilitated noble leadership. This speech’s powerful invocation of manhood was allegedly what
convinced Theodore Roosevelt, who was present, to nominate Holmes for a seat on the US
Supreme Court when he became President.
In an earlier speech, also delivered on Memorial Day, Holmes had expressed women’s
wartime nobility and sacrifice as contingent upon those of men: “There are those still living
whose sex forbade them to offer their lives, but who gave instead their happiness” (Holmes
1884). The sight of these sorrowful widows, “set apart” from society and even friends, was
uplifting for the men who witnessed them. Holmes proposed two models through which such
women had transformed their grief into valuable contributions: “I think of one whom the poor of
a great city know as their benefactress and friend. I think of one who has lived not less greatly in
the midst of her children, to whom she has taught such lessons as may not be heard elsewhere
from mortal lips” (Id.). Yet, both public and private nurturing were not fit topics for public or
political discourse, in Holmes’ view, as he admonished that their stories be passed over “in
reverent silence” (Id.). The men who performed the primary sacrifices, however, were not only
to be thought of silently, but rather to be spoken of and rendered publicly historic (Id.).
Holmes was tapping into an important dynamic that has operated through the span of
American history – the dynamic link between military service and sacrifice and citizenship. In
light of the US’s current engagement in warfare, many scholars have turned to re-examine this
dynamic, thinking through the significance of an all-volunteer military and the nature of the
National Guard’s citizen-soldiers (see, in particular, Feldman 2008). This focus on citizenship
and its meaning has been productive in advancing our theorizing on the factors that contribute to
state actors’ and individuals’ attributions of citizenship in times of war. But at the same time,
civil libertarians have cautioned about the tendency of the government to restrict rights during
wartime. Focusing on abuses in Guantanamo Bay, domestic surveillance, and the creeping use of
torture by the US military and other individuals acting through or for the United States,
academics and lawyers have raised consciousness about the erosion of rights and ethical and
humane standards of conduct in this war, but by extension in wartime generally. This extension
encompasses the severe limits on freedom of speech and expression cropping up at various
points when the US was involved in wars, but particularly during and after the Civil War and
World Wars I and II, and also highlights the restrictions on due process pursued by Lincoln
during the Civil War.
Historical institutionalist scholars, however, have noted an interesting anomaly. While
generally scholars correctly perceive wartime as a time of rights curtailment, in the wake of at
least some military conflicts, people of color have seen advances in their rights and in their
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access to full citizenship. Mary Dudziak presented a comprehensive historical argument for her
claim that African Americans saw significant gains in their access to rights because of their
crucial rhetorical and political situation in the Cold War ideological struggles (Dudziak 2000).
Daniel Kryder has built off of that argument, showing that the political and military imperatives
of building up the United States’ arsenal and securing reelection led Roosevelt to embrace racial
reform during World War II (Kryder 2001). Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith have argued that
African Americans have generally gained rights in the context of their civic participation as key
contributors in moments of crisis in the United States, identifying the advances of Reconstruction
and of the post World War II era as the primary examples (Klinkner and Smith 1999). And Mark
Graber has developed this insight further in a piece arguing explicitly that wars have generally
provided opportunities for extending equality rights to racial minorities (Graber 2006).
While these scholars disagree on the precise mechanism and the causal chains that have
led to the expansion and extension of rights to people of color during wartime, they agree that
some relationship exists. They also agree that, whether the relationship between service and
sacrifice in times of crisis and the granting of rights is based in ethics, political pragmatism, or
power relations, it is the service and sacrifice that set the dynamic into motion. In a sense, they
argue Holmes’ position in reverse: rather than citizenship’s receiving its highest and noblest
expression through military service and sacrifice, serving as a crucial component in a time of
military crisis provides the groundwork for extending the scope of citizenship. Reading race into
the discussions of civic membership thus provides a useful opportunity to reexamine the
common belief that national crises generally produce curtailments in civil liberties and rights.
But how far does this revision extend? In particular, what happens if gender is read into
the analysis? Cynthia Enloe (2001) has argued that masculinity, particularly as expressed
through military ideology, is related to civic membership. Carl Stychin (1998) likewise
articulates a vision of ideal citizenship that strongly privileges heterosexual and masculine
service to the state through the military, drawing connections between this ideal and the
American military’s intermittent efforts to frame homosexuals as security threats. And Gretchen
Ritter has highlighted how, despite women’s expanded opportunities in the workplace during the
military mobilization of World War II, women generally experienced constrictions of their social
and civic capacities to act as public members of the state in the wake of the war (Ritter 2006).
This paper considers two moments that scholars generally agree featured advances for
African Americans’ citizenship – the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction, and World War II
and its immediate aftermath – and reads these moments through lenses of race and gender. I
consider the conjunction of acknowledged sacrifices and contributions to the state, the rights
advances achieved, and the gendered and racialized conceptions of citizen service emerging out
of both post-war periods. This conjunction suggests that the kind of citizenship that people of
color gained during and after wartime crises depended upon gendered and racialized hierarchies
that valued the masculine service of soldiering by African American men but provided no
parallel framework for valuing feminine service – because the path of producing and rearing
children for the state was closed to women of color as a form of valued and desired civic service.
Both in the Civil War and post-Civil War period and in the World War II and post-WWII period,
the expansion of citizenship rights to incorporate African Americans took place at the
intersection of race and gender through their connection to civic service.
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The Civil War, Emancipation, and Contract Rights
When the Civil War began, the major conflict over slavery was more connected to the
expansion of slavery into the territories than about emancipation directly. Various scholars have
situated the significance of emancipation differently, but the imperatives of war drove the north
toward emancipation as the war progressed. Emancipation related to military objectives in two
primary ways: as an incentive to African Americans to contribute to the union effort and as a
foreign policy tool to maintain British neutrality. Lincoln’s initial response to blacks who crossed
the front and demanded freedom was not encouraging; when General John Fremont issued an
order freeing every slave owned by a Confederate in rebellious Missouri, Lincoln
countermanded it (Bickers 2006: 77). But soon thereafter, Massachusetts General Benjamin
Butler devised the legal framing that would govern the question of escaped slaves for much of
the war. He reasoned that, if these slaves were considered by their seceding owners to be
property, the Union could lawfully take possession of them and consider them to be seized
contraband under the conventions of warfare (Id.). Contraband camps soon flourished in multiple
locations, and generals in command over them argued over what to do with the former slaves. In
at least two instances, the freed slaves were given substantial land holdings to work and were
encouraged, in one case with substantial paternal oversight, to develop agricultural settlements
that would be on a path toward self governance (Id. at 79-80). In these instances, the former
slaves were treated as citizens in training.
In the process of transforming slaves from property into emergent citizens, those running
the contraband camps and setting up the new experiments in self governance showed great
concern with establishing formal and legally recognizable familial bonds among the slaves
(Franke 1999). Divisions among generals over how to manage the problem of human contraband
in part led to formal congressional study of the issue in 1863, and the establishment of the
Bureau of Abandoned Lands, Refugees, and Freedmen (rather than the Bureau of Emancipation
recommended by the congressional commission) (Bickers 2006: 81). The freedmen and their
advocates now had a formal avenue through which they could press their top priorities: demands
for land, education, and civil protection under the law (Id.).
But freed slaves and blacks who had been free before the outbreak of war could often
frame their engagement with the United States in terms different than as supplicants for rights. In
1862, Congress, recognizing the major threat posed by military manpower shortages, passed the
Militia Act, which empowered the president to call up 300,000 more men from the state militias.
The act specifically authorized the states to call up blacks for use in any military capacity,
breaking with the long-term practice of limiting state militia service to white men alone
(Klinkner & Smith 1999: 59). General Butler and Kansas General John Lane pushed forward
despite Lincoln’s ambivalence, and began to organize black units primarily composed of free
blacks, but including some fugitive slaves. The Emancipation Proclamation, issued after the
Union’s bloody victory at Antietam, not only announced the end of slavery in the non-rebellious
states, but also cleared the way for the full enlistment of blacks as soldiers. After the
Republicans’ losses in the 1862 midterm elections, tapping into this source of willing recruits
was vital to continuing the war effort, and only a year after emancipation, the black ranks of the
Union army had swelled to more than 50,000 (Id. at 61-63).
The admission of large numbers of black soldiers into the Union ranks soon precipitated
another crisis; however, as these men realized that they were not being paid equally with white
soldiers of the same rank. Records from a court martial proceeding involving Massachusetts’
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Fifty-fifth Regiment indicate that, after the black soldiers refused to accept their paychecks, the
tensions between them and their white officers exploded into a full-scale brawl (Samito 2007:
170-171). Black soldiers pushed for equal pay but also for the expansion of their civic rights. In
doing so, they highlighted their status as soldiers; as one soldier explained, they “could not
accept anything except equal pay from the federal government if they were to stand as American
citizens and assured that ‘we have been tried in the fire both of affliction and of the rebels, and
nothing remains but pure metal’” (Id. at 171). These statements implied or clearly stated that
black soldiers had earned rights through their military sacrifices. At the same time, the soldiers
and their advocates invoked the soldiers’ responsibilities as husbands and fathers to support their
wives or partners and children (Id.).
The process of dealing with disciplinary issues in the Civil War also provided some black
men with their first experience of being recognized as civic rights holders. Ironically, while
facing courts martial for serious offenses many soldiers received scrupulously correct process
and fully adversarial hearings, leading to their severe punishment on the same kinds of terms
provided to white soldiers (Id. at 172-74). In one trial, an abolitionist advocate argued on the
behalf of his client that freed slaves were still emerging from the savagery that their captivity had
engendered and could not be held to the same moral standards as whites. The judge advocate in
the case responded that freeing and arming blacks raised them to a level of full civic
membership, responsibility and accountability (Id. at 174-75). The provision of a gun, continued
the judge, rendered the Negro a man and a citizen, and left him in a position of fatal
responsibility for his own offenses. The defendant in the case was hanged alongside a white
civilian in June of 1865 (Id.).
The formal participation of blacks in the Union Army was visible and provided a site for
the struggle over the meaning of black citizenship. But this visibility and struggle overshadows
even more substantial informal contributions to the war effort performed by free blacks and
fugitive slaves, who conducted reconnaissance, spied out terrain, maintained supply lines, and
generally contributed their intimate knowledge of the territory on which the battles were being
fought as the lines moved south. And some informal participation came in the form of fighting as
irregular forces. Perhaps the best known example is Harriet Tubman’s leadership of a raid on the
Combahee River. Commanding 150 black troops, Tubman and (white) Colonel Montgomery
traveled down the river through the region of a major ferry, routing Confederate troops and
freeing approximately 800 slaves (Conrad 1863). Despite the press coverage given to Tubman’s
raid, these irregulars largely remained unrecognized and unheralded.
As the war was winding down, the Freedmen’s Bureau sought to equip the emancipated
slaves with the tools for citizenship. A few radical experiments with land reform were pursued,
as noted above. But another major agenda for both the federal government and the reconstituted
southern states was the encouragement or coercion of the freed persons to organize their family
lives to conform with accepted norms of family organization and daily living. Marriages between
freedmen and freedwomen were aggressively pressed, especially in circumstances in which
freedwomen had children (Onwuachi-Willig 2005, Yamin 2008, Cott 2000). The freedmen were
encouraged to find wage labor and, if possible, to use their earnings to support their wives and
their wives’ children. And the struggles over extending rights to the newly freed slaves relied
upon an implicitly gendered order.
Immediately after the end of the war, debates began nationally to decide how to manage
the transition to freedom in a formal and legal sense as well. In an address delivered to Congress
at the end of 1865, Andrew Johnson proposed a vision relating the freedmen’s rights to their
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growing capacity for civic membership, but advocated for allowing the states to make these
determinations:
In my judgment, the freedmen, if they show patience and manly virtues, will sooner
obtain a participation in the elective franchise through the States than through the general
government, even if it had power to intervene. When the tumult of emotions that have
been raised by the suddenness of the social change shall have subsided, it may prove that
they will receive the kindest usage from some of those on whom they have heretofore
most closely depended. . . . I have no doubt that now, after the close of the war, it is not
competent for the general government to extend the elective franchise in the several
States [Johnson 1865:15]
Yet within this vision, Johnson privileged particular rights as the most important to fit the
freedmen for the training and protections necessary to guarantee the good exercise of civic
membership. He implied that, for these rights, the federal government would have a role to play:
it is equally clear that good faith requires the security of the freedmen in their liberty and their
property, their right to labor, and their right to claim the just return of their labor. I cannot too
strongly urge a dispassionate treatment of this subject, which should be carefully kept aloof from
all party strife” (Id.). He remained agnostic about the possibility for whites and blacks to live
together “in a state of mutual benefit and good will,” but advocated for whites and the federal
government in particular to “encourage them to honorable and useful industry, where it may be
beneficial to themselves and to the country; and, instead of hasty anticipations of the certainty of
failure, let there be nothing wanting to the fair trial of the experiment” (Id.). Johnson saw the
fundamental difference between the freedman and the slave explicitly as a “substitution of labor
by contract for the status of slavery” (Id.). But freedmen could not gain the responsibility for
agreeing to honest labor as long as doubts remained about their capacity to choose their work and
be certain to recover fair wages for their work. This, for Johnson, had clear legal implications:
“And if the one ought to be able to enforce the contract, so ought the other. The public interest
will be best promoted if the several States will provide adequate protection and remedies for the
freedmen” (Id.). But what would the southern states do when entrusted with the responsibility to
guarantee freedmen’s capacity to make and enforce contracts?
The southern states responded to emancipation and defeat by reconstituting their state
legislatures and immediately passing black codes to restrict the emancipated slaves in such
severe terms that many observers characterized these acts as reimposing slavery in all but name.
Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which situated as its centerpiece
the right to make contracts and the obligation of individuals to respect validly formulated
contracts. This dual right and obligation, while framed in neutral terms, would protect the
capacity of black individuals to make contracts with whites and hold them to these contracts’
terms. Given the comprehensiveness and depth of former Confederates’ efforts to limit the scope
and meaning of emancipation, contract rights may appear to be an odd choice as the centerpiece
of a new egalitarian order. But, when read through lenses of gender and status, contract rights
emerge as a logical choice for the men who had either fought for the union or who were
represented by those who had fought against the confederacy.
The right to make enforceable contracts depended upon status. Individuals possessing
comparatively subordinated status in formal terms had great difficulty in forming legally
meaningful contracts, and if contracts were formed, their enforceability was questionable at best.
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Children could not make enforceable contracts with parents, servants could not make enforceable
contracts with masters, and one of the badges of slavery was slaves’ inability to make binding
contracts with their masters or with anyone else, for that matter. These legal debilities all derived
from the structurally subordinated status of the putative contract maker, implying a structural
incapacity for the subordinated individual to negotiate and achieve the meeting of minds that was
the hallmark of a valid contract. But the other major class of individuals who had problematic or
incomplete access to contract due to their status was women.
Congress’ aim in guaranteeing contract rights for the emancipated slaves is disputed, but
could be seen as an effort to prevent southern state legislatures from reconstructing the status of
slavery through specific limiting legislation. Contract rights would protect the capacity to
bargain for labor and the wages to be paid to laborers. They would also serve to protect freed
persons in a myriad of potential commercial interactions with whites (and secondarily with each
other). Thus, they could situate emancipated individuals as fuller citizens, as equal in formal
terms to others who could exercise contractual power as an inherent part of their civic
membership. Contract rights were key markers of agency and civic membership. They implied
that the contractors were equal in power in abstract terms, that they had the capacity to make
binding agreements, and that they had automatic access to the legal system to arbitrate disputes
and to enforce performance or damages if one of the contracting parties did not acknowledge the
validity of a properly formed contract.
In addition to guarding against the reimposition of slave status, though, contract rights’
connections to autonomous individualism and citizenship rendered their possessors citizens in
gendered forms. The contracts that the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act encouraged blacks
to form were contracts for wage labor, for land leasing or perhaps ownership, and for the
purchase and control of other real and personal property. Another type of contract – the marriage
contract – was more controversial and differently configured, as in some cases it was practically
coerced (particularly between freedmen and freedwomen) and in others it was legally forbidden
(between blacks and whites). A legal struggle eventually settled that, despite the use of the
language of contract without reservation or modification, the marriage contract was not one that
fell under the ordinary rules for interpreting contractual equality (Novkov 2008).
The contract rights gained were consciously rights that recognized black men as citizens
and reinforced their autonomous standing as men. In exchange for their invaluable service as
warriors, they gained the right to act as heads of household, negotiating in meaningful and
enforceable ways to perform the masculine tasks of laboring for wages and owning personal and
real property to support the household. While these rights could extend to women, black women
along with white women faced significant ambiguities relating to their status as women,
particularly if married – and remember that many black women were very strongly encouraged
to marry, especially if they had children.
The Fourteenth Amendment demonstrated the desire to expand civic membership in
response to the crisis of the Civil War, but it also reinforced the contract rights guaranteed in the
Civil Rights Act. The debates over the amendment covered a range of issues, but did not address
the potential implications of privileges or immunities, due process, or equal protection for
women. While discussions of the freedmen generally were assumed to incorporate the
freedwomen, the freedwomen implicitly became free women, not full citizens.
Nowhere was this tension – and the distinction – more evident than in the process behind
and adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. The achievement of the right to vote poses another
example of this dynamic in practice. Adding suffrage to the constitution was controversial not
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just generally, but within circles of activists seeking social transformation. The anti-racist and
feminist movements split off from each other over whether suffrage generally should be pursued
or only suffrage for African Americans.
The amendment ratified in February of 1870 guaranteed that “the right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” This language was not reached,
however, without an extensive debate inside and outside of Congress over whether female
suffrage should be federally extended and protected. When extending suffrage to the
emancipated slaves came up for debate in the Senate in 1866, several Democrats and moderate
Republicans used the issue of female voting to attempt to derail the entire discussion. James
Brooks, a Representative from New York, presented a letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton and a
petition from Susan B. Anthony asking for an amendment prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sex (Epps 2006: 111; 216).2 Kansas Senator Samuel Pomeroy presented petitions to Congress
from citizens of Michigan, New York, Massachusetts, Kansas, New Jersey, Ohio, Maine,
Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Indiana “praying that in any amendment to the Constitution of the
United States to extend or regulate suffrage no distinction be made between men and women”
(Senate Journal, 2/15/1868: 46; 1/20/1869: 122; 1/6/1869: 74; 12/17/1868: 54). Another Senator
presented a petition from Rhode Island advocating for women’s votes (Senate Journal,
3/23/1869: 73). And the Senate’s president pro tempore presented a petition from Massachusetts
asking for suffrage to be extended to women in the District of Columbia and all United States
territories (Senate Journal, 1/18/1869: 109).
Outside of Congress, feminists and abolitionists who had struggled together to advance
rights for African Americans and women in the antebellum era split bitterly over suffrage.
Feminism as an active movement had grown out of abolition, but as the movement expanded, it
began to incorporate women’s advocates who were not necessarily committed either to abolition
or to the cause of achieving black equality (Ritter 2006).3 During the war, Susan B. Anthony had
advocated for continuing the struggle for women’s rights, but her long-term friend and
collaborator, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, disagreed, and Stanton’s viewpoint won the day.4
After the war, Stanton and Anthony rejoined the battle for women’s rights, which quickly
turned into a racialized struggle. Advocates for women were enraged at reports about quiet
discussions in the joint Senate-House committee charged with harmonizing the language for
guaranteeing suffrage in which one member allegedly objected to “enfranchis[ing] all the
Southern wenches” and another claimed that black male suffrage “will be all the strain the
Republican party can stand” (Epps 2006: 215). Leading feminists convened and an ugly debate
erupted over whether women or blacks needed, deserved, or would make better use of the vote.
Frederick Douglass, infuriated by Stanton’s inflammatory rhetoric and use of the word “Sambo,”
publicly attacked her in the late 1860s, charging:
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I do not see how any one can pretend that there is the same urgency in giving the ballot to
woman as to the negro . . . . When women, because they are women, are hunted down
through the cities of New York and New Orleans; when they are dragged from their
houses and hung on lamp-posts; when their children are torn from their arms, and their
brains dashed out upon the pavement; when they are objects of insult and outrage at
every turn; . . . when their children are not allowed to enter schools; then they will have
an urgency to obtain the ballot equal to our own .[Douglass, quoted in Epps 2006: 218]
Ironically, neither Douglass nor his white female antagonists acknowledged that some of the
negroes about whom Douglass was speaking and to whom the ballot would continue to be denied
by the Fifteenth Amendment were also women.
The Fifteenth Amendment went through and was ratified without the addition of gender.
Some advocates for woman suffrage promoted the New Departure, a strategy based on arguing
that women as national citizens had been granted the vote as the logical implication of the
Reconstruction Amendments taken as a whole, but focusing particularly on the Fourteenth
Amendment. Leaders Anthony, Stanton, and Virginia Minor argued that birthright national
citizenship clearly included women, that women were entitled to all of the rights and privileges
of citizenship by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that voting was covered as a privilege
under the privileges or immunities clause (Ritter 2006: 19). Despite their work in Congress,
cultural spheres, and the courts, this standpoint was definitively rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Minor v. Happersett in 1875, with the Court following Slaughter-House’s narrow
interpretation of privileges or immunities as non-transformational and noting that female
citizenship alongside denial of suffrage had been commonly accepted at the founding and
afterward (88 U.S. 162). Voting remained – temporarily – a privilege of black male citizenship.
As the wave of progress slowed for black men, women’s rights moved further into
retrograde around roiling cultural tensions over sexuality. In 1873, Anthony Comstock’s crusade
reached its apogee in Congress, with the national legislature passing the Comstock Act banning
the transport of any “obscene, lewd, and/or lascivious” materials through the US mails. The act
was intended to target the distribution of information about contraception and abortion as well as
to close down a booming mail-order abortifacient and contraceptive provisioning industry.
Comstock and his allies combined race and gender productively, invoking the need to protect
white women from dangers to their health alongside panic about fertility rates among white
Protestants. This combination situated white women as worthwhile civic members for their
reproductive labor while simultaneously heightening anxieties about the reproductive labor of
women of color and recent immigrants. Reading the passage of the Comstock Laws alongside
Minor suggests strongly that women’s primary and most valued civic contribution was the
production of white children. This contrasted starkly with black men’s dynamic: the active
engagement with the machinery of governance earned through military sacrifice and through the
Republican Party’s need for black (male) investment.
[add here a discussion of Sullivan’s analysis of Married Women’s Property Acts, judicial
retrograde, and how property rights looked for women in contrast with the 1866 Civil Rights
Act]
The years between approximately 1863 and 1875 thus saw a fascinating divergence
between the rights extended to blacks both to maintain and enhance their vital support for the
United States in the military conflict and for the Republican Party afterward on the one hand, and
the rights limited for and withdrawn from women, particularly black women, who could not
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make a parallel gendered bargain with the state. The crisis of the Civil War and the mobilization
of hundreds of thousands of black men led to the nation’s reliance on them and recognition of
them as men. As a reward, the freedmen gained masculinized rights intended simultaneously to
transform their status and reinforce their access to protection for this new status. These rights,
however, were both masculinized rights and were extended on implicitly and explicitly gendered
grounds. Rights for women remained static or went retrograde during the same period, relating
significantly to women’s civic relationship to the state. Whereas men’s access to “first-class
citizenship”5 came through military service, women’s highest civic responsibility remained as
wives and mothers. This civic responsibility then played out across racialized lines. White
women who were not disfavored immigrants or their recent descendants were cabined within a
social and legal machinery encouraging their fulfillment of this duty. Black women were
disciplined through the production of a regime designed to reinforce their status as second-class
wives and mothers whose potential racial and social contamination would be contained within
the bonds of intraracial marriage and individual dependence upon their new citizen-husbands.

World War II Civil Rights
As Franklin D. Roosevelt was increasingly seeing the United States’ involvement in
World War II as inevitable, he faced growing tensions over race from the civilian labor force as
it geared up into wartime production mode. He had lines of communication to black leaders,
reflecting black voters’ overwhelming realignment away from the party that had ended slavery to
the party of the New Deal in the 1930s. In 1941, A. Philip Randolph, leader of the influential
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, proposed a march on Washington to protest racial
discrimination among defense contractors, in the federal government, and in the armed forces
and garnered the support of Walter White, head of the NAACP. When Roosevelt was informed,
he issued executive order 8802, which made changes in governmental hiring practices and, most
importantly, established the Fair Employment Practices Commission to reinforce this mandate
(Estes 2005: 16-17).
The order itself declared the official policy of the United States to be to “encourage full
participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless of
race, creed, color, or national origin.” Gender was not mentioned in the order, and purpose of the
order was clearly linked to national defense. The order went on to declare that the successful
defense of “the democratic way of life within the Nation” could be conducted only “with the help
and support of all groups within its borders” (Executive Order 8802). The order cited the clear
evidence that defense contractors were discriminating and declared this behavior to be
detrimental both to the workers’ morale and to national unity. Executive policy and
administrative efforts thus situated black labor and military mobilization as crucial to the war
effort and discrimination as potentially threatening to national defense, but ignored the issue of
women’s mobilization. In 1943, Roosevelt strengthened the FEPC’s mandate by requiring all
defense contractors to include a non-discrimination clause in their contracts and subcontracts.
As military mobilization geared up, African Americans enlisted. More than one million
served in the armed forces, despite the humiliations of basic training in the segregated south and
the initial rules and customs barring blacks from combat duty. Historian Steve Estes argued that
“there was a sense among African American men that participation and valorous service in war
5

See Enloe’s analysis of this idea in Maneuvers (2000).
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could uplift their race and gain them respect and recognition as men” (Estes 2005: 13). This
sense was heightened when the first reports began to circulate about black mess attendant Dorie
Miller, who reacted to the chaos wrought by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor by manning a
50 mm Browning anti-aircraft gun that he had never been trained to operate and firing at the
Japanese planes until his ammunition was exhausted and he was ordered to abandon ship (Navy
Historical Service, n.d.). The black press picked up on Miller’s heroism and lionized him, and
after significant pressure from these journalists and the NAACP, Miller was awarded the Navy
Cross in 1942 (Estes 2005: 12-15). Many young black men, reading or hearing about Miller’s
story, enlisted with enthusiasm to fight for their country and implicitly for their own freedom and
manhood. Recruiters for the armed forces understood the dynamic of heroic, masculine service
to the nation operating, and tapped into it with great success in their efforts to enlist African
Americans.
Once these men were serving, many began to think of themselves as men and citizens
who were entitled to be treated with the respect and dignity owed to soldiers risking their lives
for the nation. As historians have documented, the Tuskegee airmen struggled against both direct
animus and low expectations, ultimately convincing many white observers of their mettle
through their stellar training and combat records. Other black soldiers and veterans increasingly
got involved in scuffles with whites that occasionally escalated to mass violence. One such
incident was the racial trouble at Camp Stewart, Georgia, detailed by Daniel Kryder (2000). By
the beginning of 1943, many recruits chafed under formal policies and informal practices based
in racial degradation, and over the course of six months, relations between white officers and
black recruits deteriorated. George Nesbitt, an NAACP member who had worked with the Race
Relations Branch of the U.S. Housing Authority prior to enlisting, wrote to his former colleagues
regularly, describing white discrimination and tensions between northern and southern blacks.
As the situation developed, the black recruits and officers unified against white disrespect, and
the NAACP began to receive a flood of complaints about specific incidents, some accompanied
by warnings that the situation would become violent (Kryder 2000: 168-76).
The camp exploded that summer when a rumor spread among the black soldiers that
white soldiers or MPS had murdered a black soldier and raped and murdered his wife. While the
exact facts of the rumor were never confirmed, there were numerous accounts of harassment and
physical violence being exercised against black soldiers’ wives. After an apparently calm day,
about 100 black soldiers assembled in military formation at 9:30 at night and were ordered to
disperse. The crowd of black soldiers grew, however, and when the MPs confronted them and
began to arrest people, some shots were fired. While that crowd then partially dispersed by about
10 PM, other groups congregated, and more exchange of fire between black troops and white
MPs took place. Investigators could not agree about how many shots were fired, but estimates
ranged from between six and eight hundred rounds to between five and six thousand rounds. One
MP was killed and four wounded (Id. at 186-95). The resulting investigation came close to
seeing the tensions as a result of segregation and discrimination, but did not completely endorse
this explanation. And Kryder notes that this incident demonstrates an increased willingness
among blacks to seek change through direct and violent action rather than through formal or
legal means (Id. at 206).
Throughout the state courts in the south, soldiers and veterans were turning up as
criminal defendants in racial conflicts and victims of racialized violence. In a case from
Alabama, a twenty two year old veteran who had seen combat in Europe objected strenuously
when a male, partially disabled courthouse janitor in his seventies confronted him over his use of
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the wrong toilet. Their verbal struggle escalated into a physical altercation, and the feeble
janitor’s reliance on the power of Jim Crow to enforce his will against a 6’ combat veteran left
him stunned on the floor, beaten down by his own mop handle. But the Alabama appellate court
hearing the case upheld the soldier’s fine for assaulting the janitor (Novkov 2008). Numerous
other scattered incidents occurred, underlining a new ethos of resistance to the daily humiliations
of segregation and anxieties among racist whites confronted by black soldiers and veterans (Id.).6
Black soldiers increasingly found themselves moving out of supporting roles and into
combat as combat losses increased. Service in Europe provided experience in a more racially
tolerant environment, but also presented risks, as Leroy Henry, a black GI convicted of raping a
British farmer’s wife, discovered. Henry was sentenced to death by a U.S. military tribunal,
although he was exonerated after a fuller investigation prompted by an outcry in the liberal
British press. Anxieties about sexual misconduct among black soldiers ran high among white
officers; while black troops were less than 10 percent of military personnel serving in the
European theatre, they composed 42 percent of those convicted of sexual assault, most of these
convictions involving accusations of assault against white women (Estes 2005: 32-33). But both
the Black Panther tank battalion7 and the Tuskegee Airmen distinguished themselves in battle,
and media reports of their exploits dispelled myths that blacks were intellectually,
psychologically, or physically unfit to defend the nation through arms (Id.).
Many veterans became politically activated through their experience in fighting a war
against fascism and for democracy and freedom. Black veterans joined the NAACP, but also
worked as organizers to bring in other veterans. National membership in the NAACP had been
50,556 in 1940. By 1946, the numbers had reached nearly 450,000 (Estes 2005: 36). President
Truman, faced with the internal political activism of blacks and the external pressures beginning
to arise from the incipient Cold War, issued Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948. The order
initiated the full desegregation of the U.S. armed forces, declaring “there shall be equality of
treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color,
religion or national origin.” In language prescient of the wording in Brown v. Board of Education
II though not in concrete implementation, the order dictated that desegregation should take place
“as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary
changes without impairing efficiency or morale” (Truman 1948). Truman’s justification for the
order invoked holding the United States to the “highest standards of democracy,” which he
defined as providing “equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our
country's defense” (Id.). While Truman’s bold act, followed by Hubert Humphrey’s advocacy for
a civil rights plank in the Democratic Party platform at the national convention, sparked the
public revolt of the Dixiecrats and electoral losses in the south, he and northern Democrats
reaped the electoral benefit in the west and in northern cities (Estes 2005: 37).
Truman was reelected on November 2, 1948. On November 19, the United States
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the first case specifically addressing regulation of
women’s labor for more than a decade.8 The issue in the case, Goesaert v. Cleary, was the
constitutionality of a Michigan statute that prohibited women from serving as bartenders in cities
6

NOTE: follow up and look for low level legal trouble involving WACs, WAVES, WASPS, etc.
NOTE: follow up and figure out if this ever had any connection to the BPP.
8
The most recent previous case was West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, which upheld a minimum wage for women on
ambiguously gendered grounds, overturning Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, in which the Supreme Court had used
the Nineteenth Amendment as evidence that women were equal to men and therefore no longer entitled to special
protections (see Novkov 2001).
7
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unless they were the wives or daughters of the male owner. While so-called dram shop laws had
been a long-term feature of cultural anxieties about women and alcohol, and had been previously
litigated and found to be acceptable by state supreme courts (see Novkov 2001), the law in
question was no aged relic of a bygone era. Rather, the statute had been passed in 1945 and
operated by denying bartending licenses in cities with populations of 50,000 or more9 to any
woman not identified as “the wife or daughter of the male owner of any establishment licensed to
sell alcoholic liquor for consumption on the premises” (Goesaert v. Cleary 1947: 736). The law
provoked at least two class action suits, one brought by the Goesaerts from Dearborn, a mother
who owned a bar and her daughter, who was also employed there,10 and a second brought by a
barmaid and female bar owner in Detroit. The cases, both of which addressed the plaintiffs’
requests for an injunction against the law on equal protection grounds, were consolidated and
tried before a three-judge panel (Id. at 737).
The district court panel brushed aside the equal protection claims, explaining that the
Michigan legislature “may have reasonably concluded that the need for regulation of women
bartenders was much more urgent in larger cities” and that “a distinction in legislation is not
arbitrary, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it” (Id. at 738).
Specifically, the legislature could reasonably conclude that the credible grave social problem of
female bartenders could be mitigated if a male licensee was “ultimately responsible for the
condition and decorum maintained in his establishment” and if that responsibility were
heightened by the “self interest of male licensees in protecting the immediate members of their
families.” Further, the legislature could conclude that a man “could provide protection for his
wife or daughter that would be beyond the capacity of a woman licensee to provide for herself or
her daughter” (Id. at 739).11
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion, written by Frankfurter, was lighthearted and, in
Gretchen Ritter’s analysis, condescending. Invoking the “historic calling” of the “sprightly and
ribald” alewife, the court nonetheless emphasized the long-term authority of governing
authorities to regulate liquor traffic and absolved the legislature from bearing any responsibility
to “reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards” (Goesaert v. Cleary 1948: 465). The court
dismissed out of hand the possibility that “the real impulse behind this legislation was an
unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling” and declared the
recitation of the relevant equal protection precedents to be too tiresome to conduct: such a review
would produce either an “idle parade” or a “sterile inquiry” (Id. at 467). Three justices dissented
from this reasoning, explaining simply that the concrete results of the legislation belied its
alleged grounding in “legislative solicitude for the moral and physical wellbeing of women” (Id.,
Rutledge dissenting at 468).12
As Ritter explains, Goesaert was no outlier. Rather, it reflected the legal, political, and
social ethos developing at the end of the war and carrying over into the post-war era. This set up
9

NOTE: population boundary drawn specifically to incorporate Dearborn due to large Arab influx for auto industry?
Goesaert was represented by a female attorney from Detroit, Anne Davidow, both at trial and before the U.S.
Supreme Court. Davidow, a lifelong feminist, had been an active suffragist prior to the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment. Retaining her name after marriage, she established her legal practice, Davidow & Davidow, with her
brother in Detroit; they served as counsel to the Reuther brothers and the UAW (Michigan Supreme Court Historical
Society, n.d.).
11
NOTE: dissent is fascinating, particularly with back history of Goesaert’s situation – figure out how much to write
up and include.
12
NOTE: possibly contrast tone/seriousness of Korematsu??
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a situation in which, after the war, “women were seen in dualistic terms as both rights-bearing
individuals and family dependents” (Ritter 2006: 173). The international engagement and agenda
of worldwide democratization that rebounded in favor of advancing black masculine rights had a
doppelganger in the form of “isolationism and a celebration of what was distinctive about
American political culture” – and this isolationism and celebratory energy rebounded against the
expansion of women’s rights to participate fully as citizens on the same terms as men (Id.). For
many women, this dynamic played out in increasing labor restrictions (framed as clearing the
field for male workers as well as protection for women), upholding limits on women’s jury
service, an increased tendency on the part of courts and legislatures to acknowledge women’s
differences, and an erasure of the significance of women’s service during the war (Id., 156-211).
As in the Civil War, women provided vital support to the war effort. But unlike the Civil
War, World War II saw women formally incorporated into the military. Approximately 350,000
women served in gender-segregated units connected to each of the branches of the U.S. military,
and these women, except for those serving in the Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs),
were granted full military rank, though generally barred from being placed in command positions
over men (Id. at 180). After the war, these women were rapidly demobilized. Although Congress
passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act on June 12, 1948 (more than a month
before Truman’s desegregation order) and thereby established a means for women to become
permanent members of the U.S. military, the Army responded in 1949 with an order that women
with dependent children were ineligible for service, discharging all women in the Army with
children under the age of 18. Thus, as the Cold War was gearing up and the U.S. armed forces
were rapidly rebuilding, a former WAVE testified to Congress that the more than 8500 officers
and nearly 74,000 enlisted WAVES at the end of World War II had shrunk to fewer than 1000
officers and just over 7000 enlisted women by June 1952 (Hearings 1953).
[Discuss Wynn’s analysis of labor/employment]
But the cultural forces driving women back into the home, supported through policies and
governmental interventions, did not only map across gender. When the Ladies Home Journal
identified the nation’s top priority at the war’s end as “mak[ing] it better, easier, cheaper, and
safer to have at least three babies a piece” (Wynn 1996: 475), the magazine was not speaking to
or about black women. Historian Wendy Kline has argued that eugenics, after falling into
disfavor as a consequence of the Nazis’ enthusiasm, re-entered the cultural, social, and policy
arena in the 1950s with a new, positive spin. Rather than discouraging or preventing the unfit
from reproducing, the emphasis would turn to encouraging the fit to reproduce profligately
(Kline 2001). This tied into the long-term ideological configuration of feminine citizenship’s
highest form of service as the production and raising of future citizens, but 1) valued and
reinforced women’s citizenship by encouraging their retirement from the public and civic
spheres, and 2) affected African American women by simultaneously purging them from the
public sphere and reinforcing the very marker of citizenship to which they could not aspire.
Black women would go on to be crucial leaders in the civil rights movement, but, as
Estes and numerous other scholars have demonstrated, did much of this work in less visible or
invisible ways and venues, both allowing and reinforcing black masculine bids for full
citizenship. The unambiguous extensions of rights on racial grounds that took place during and
after World War II related to masculinity and in particular to militarily masculinized conceptions
of rights to which women only had uneasy access: equal employment opportunities in the
defense contracting industry and desegregation of the armed forces.
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Further, while no policies parallel to the stringent pressures to marry and to refrain from
sexual relations with white men were imposed upon black women in the late 1940s and 1950s,
anxieties about black family structure and black reproduction focusing squarely and critically
upon black women were not long in coming. As welfare programs expanded access beyond their
initial clientele of white widows and some single mothers, policy makers fretted about black
hyper-reproduction and imposed policies designed to discourage and control black fertility and to
pressure single black women into monogamous marital relationships (Mink 1996, Williams
2000). Benefits were conditioned upon compliance with standards of sexual conduct, which led
to such policies as the notorious “man in the house” rules common in the south that resulted in
denial of benefits to thousands of women and children (Id.).
Conclusion
Mark Graber, drawing from the work of Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith, has proposed
the following four conditions as determining when protection and expansion of civil rights and
liberties will take place during international conflict:
1. “A large-scale war requires extensive economic or military mobilization of the
beneficiaries of a rights protective policy for success.”
2. “The nature of America’s enemies prompts American leaders to justify such wars and
their attendant sacrifices by emphasizing the nation’s inclusive, egalitarian, democratic
traditions” or, at least, the national commitment to particular civil rights and liberties.
3. The beneficiaries of the civil right or liberty are, for reasons of race, ethnicity, or
ideology, identified as loyal Americans, as aligned with American allies or countries
whose support the United States is seeking, or at least as enemies of America’s enemies.
4. Powerful political actors inside and outside government see the military conflict as an
additional reason for advancing existing commitments to particular civil liberties and
rights. Other crucial government actors can be persuaded or pressured to support those
rights or liberties. [Graber 2005: 97]
These factors do well in explaining rights advances for African Americans generally, but the
nature of the dynamic is more complex than they would indicate. Bringing in concepts of
masculinity, militarization, and sexuality provides more explanatory leverage that can parse out
how the rights advances are configured, to whom they primarily apply, and where and how they
are limited.
One way to think through what adding these factors contributes is, in the case of whites
and African Americans, to think about the divergence in terms of generating a triple brake on
rights advances. In both periods near the wars’ end and afterwards, masculine spaces and
institutions were opened up to African Americans, and state institutions made commitments to
respect and enforce their access to these spaces and institutions. These advances were achieved
through the invocation of black men’s roles as soldiers who were now entitled to first class
citizenship – or at least to something closer to it, and the rights that were provided were
simultaneously designed to reward men’s vital contributions to the war on the front lines and as
supporters and to reinforce their capacity to perform the gendered and sexualized function of
head of household. In sum, rights were granted in gratitude and recognition for military service,
extracted based on the necessity of black mobilization for the war effort, or extended through the
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discontinuities between patriotic rhetorics of freedom and democracy and the real situation of
some of the soldiers who had fought to advance or preserve these ideas, but all of these forwardmoving engines were intimately interlinked with both masculinity and militarization and thus
were subject to three gendered and sexualized brakes.
The first braking element was the direct effect of retrogrades in women’s rights. Of
course, black women suffered the same legal limits as women as the white women who were the
primary targets of post-war policies and legislation. Alongside the prominent white suffragists
who saw their dream fading in the face of the political realities that drove the gendered
compromise in the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment were black feminists like Sojourner
Truth and Frederick Douglass who chose to remain quiet about their losses or openly advocated
for black men’s votes in order to maintain the nation’s uncertain commitment to black suffrage.
After World War II, black women were hounded out of the military and purged from the factory
labor force with equal, if not greater, vigor than their white female comrades-in-arms,
commanders, co-workers, and supervisors.
The second braking element, however, arose from the tension around the divergence in
the trajectories of rights for blacks and women. This was particularly acute in the post-Civil War
era, as white feminists’ bitter resentment over the provision of suffrage on gendered grounds
generated a split between rights advocates who had previously been so closely aligned as to be
the same movement. The desperate struggle quickly became framed as a zero-sum conflict
between black men and white women, and the intemperate and racist language of movement
leaders like Anthony and Stanton reverberated for generations. Even sixty to seventy years after,
when white feminists were still fighting for suffrage and middle-class advocates were advancing
a broad-based social agenda of helping and seeking rights for immigrant women, poor women,
Native Americans, and children, the suffrage movement remained rigidly segregated, and black
rights remained off the agenda for white reformers.13 While this dynamic was not so stark during
and immediately after World War II, tensions did exist, and were frequently expressed in the
south through increased and sexualized anxieties about black men’s newly acknowledged
masculine power in conjunction with the newly exaggerated “cult of white womanhood.”
The third braking element was the effect of the activation of the womanly side of
citizenship in response to the heightened attention to masculinized citizenship relating to military
mobilization. In both post-war periods, cultural messages about women’s primary service to the
state as wives and mothers, as the keepers of the home and the bearers and rearers of the next
generation intensified, but as countless feminist scholars have demonstrated, these cultural
messages were racialized as well as gendered. Black women could be pressured or coerced into
keeping stable homes, discouraged from working outside the home (unless they were working in
white homes), and marrying and remaining married. But because black children were devalued,
black women were problematically situated with regard to the cultural messages and their
expressions through law and policy. Pressures were placed on white women to reproduce
responsibly, but to reproduce. Black women were pressured not to reproduce so much, and if
they were to reproduce, to do so 1) within the bonds of marriage, 2) with a man who would
support them and their children sufficiently so that they would never request or require assistance
from the state, 3) in ways that would not interfere with their availability as low cost domestic
13

The anti-lynching movement was a major exception to this; while the movement was led by African Americans,
particularly Ida B. Wells and W.E.B. DuBois, some white feminists contributed energy to the movement, and
experiences in the anti-lynching movement was crucial in sparking a quiet but important indigenous, moderate,
coalition of reformist white women exemplified by individuals like Loula Dunn.
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workers, and 4) ideally only with black men, but definitely never with white men. As Paula
Giddings has famously observed, all African Americans’ access to equality was ultimately
bounded by the barriers to black women’s entry (Giddings 1984).14 The inability of black women
to engage in full civic service and sacrifice for the state resulted from their barring on racial
grounds from the feminine ideal of childbearing and mothering and from their barring on
gendered grounds from the masculine ideal of military service and its accompanying access to
first-class citizenship.
The first brake operated in both eras, the second brake more strongly in the post-Civil
War era, and the third brake slightly more strongly in the post-World War II era. But all three
combined in both postwar periods not just to limit black women’s access to rights advances, but
ultimately to bound and to stall out progressive momentum for the rights of all African
Americans. I would not be surprised to find that the same dynamic has operated with respect to
other subordinated racial groups, and would encourage scholars studying the relationship
between wartime sacrifice and opportunity and rights advances not to forget to incorporate an
analysis of gender and sexuality.
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Giddings’ book takes its title from a quotation from black feminist Anna Julia Cooper (1858-1964): “Only the
BLACK WOMAN can say ‘when and where I enter, in the quiet, undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without
violence and without suing or special patronage, then and there the whole . . . race enters with me.’”
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